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INTRODUCTION 
Given that my current interest is in the emergence of presidential 
power in the United States since World War II, my effort to fit into a 
symposium on Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, especially when 
one commentator traces the modern period of constitutionalism to the 
twelfth century, does feel like trying to squeeze a square peg into a 
round hole. But my retrospective glance at a book published sixty-five 
years ago does provide one connection to the symposium’s subject 
matter. That connection is Clinton Rossiter’s contention in 
Constitutional Dictators1 that the idea that a democratic state must have 
a mechanism to establish a powerful authoritarian rule—a 
dictatorship—during a time of crisis is rooted in the Roman Republic. 
 
 †  David Rudenstine, who was Dean of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law from 2001–
2009, is the Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law. 
 1 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948) [hereinafter CD]. 
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Thus, my paper for this conference constitutes a revisiting of Rossiter’s 
1948 study, and is entitled Roman Roots for an Imperial Presidency. 
I.     MY ROAD FROM UNITED STATES V. REYNOLDS TO ROSSITER’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 
Since 9/11 there has been a renewed, intense, almost feverish 
scholarly interest in the powers of the president and the consequences of 
those enhanced powers for a democratic regime. Although this recent 
scrutiny builds on celebrated studies made during the Vietnam War era, 
such as The Imperial Presidency by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,2 the 
contemporary level of scrutiny is broader and more intense than it was 
four decades ago.3 That is due at least in part to the expansion of the 
national security state in recent decades, and that expansion has been 
accompanied by deepening concerns that the power of the presidency 
and the authority of the various departments or agencies within the 
executive branch are not meaningfully controlled by Congress or 
meaningfully held accountable by the courts. And this critique brings 
into focus the penultimate question as to whether the president and the 
executive branch, at least as its authority and activities relate to national 
security, function outside a system of constitutional checks and 
balances.4 Or to put the matter bluntly, is the president largely above 
and beyond meaningful legal constraints when acting to protect or 
advance the national security? 
For some time now I have been researching and writing about 
United States v. Reynolds,5 decided by the Supreme Court in April 1953, 
sixty years ago. That case is not particularly well known today but yet it 
is enormously important. It is little known because the Reynolds case 
was not understood at the time to announce anything novel, even 
though it did, and because it did not set off conventional legal fire 
crackers such as a fiery and blistering dissent and substantial criticism in 
the press. However, Reynolds is important because it established the 
 
 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
 3 The literature on this subject is vast, but for more information, see generally THE 
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. 
KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2005); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, 
SECRECY (2009); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT (2006); DANA 
PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN 
SECURITY STATE (2011); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); and JON YOO, CRISIS 
AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE 
W. BUSH (2009). 
 4 A recent study on the subject summarizes the various scholarly positions on the subject. 
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3. 
 5 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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modern contours of the contemporary common law state secrets 
doctrine, a doctrine that protects the confidentiality of information that 
falls within the privilege, and a doctrine that is today both exceptionally 
significant and controversial.6 
The Reynolds case is also important because it has become one of 
the pillars of what I term the Age of Deference, a period beginning with 
the end of World War II and running through today, during which the 
federal courts have developed, adopted and endorsed an attitude of 
“utmost deference”7 towards the executive branch in cases the executive 
claims implicate national security. During this Age of Deference, federal 
courts have crafted and defined one legal doctrine after another, which, 
taken together, have more or less built a bubble over the executive 
branch in cases implicating national security, thus generally insulating 
the executive from meaningful judicial accountability.8 The 
 
 6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds announced for the first time in the history of 
the United States a set of rules that federal courts must follow in adjudicating cases in which the 
executive branch claims the state secrets privilege. Those rules continue to this day to form the 
cornerstone of the contemporary and controversial state secrets privilege. Thus, the court stated 
that the privilege may be asserted only by the government and that it should not be “lightly 
invoked.” Id. at 7. Moreover, the privilege may only be asserted “by the head of the department 
which has control over the matter,” and then, only after the department head has had ”actual 
personal consideration” of the matter. Id. at 8. The court stressed that a “court itself must 
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,” and that 
“[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers.” Id. at 8, 10. The Supreme Court also stated that a court must try to decide whether the 
privilege should be sustained “without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is 
designed to protect.” Id. at 8. To accomplish the twin goals of the court assuring that it does not 
abdicate control over the evidence to the “caprice of executive officers,” while not requiring the 
disclosure of the sensitive information, the Court stated the following guideline:  
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all of the circumstances of the case, that 
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military 
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this 
is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not 
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an 
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. 
Id. at 9–10. Lastly, the court concluded that once a judge was convinced that “military secrets 
are at stake,” the privilege must be sustained no matter how necessary and vital the information 
may be to the party seeking access to it or how directly relevant the information may be to 
matters of public importance and how useful it may be to the public. Id. at 11. Pursuant to the 
Reynolds rules, the Court granted the executive a de facto absolute privilege, and during the last 
three and one-half decades, federal courts have given the state secrets privilege rules a sweeping 
application that has thrust the privilege and the courts into a national controversy. 
 7 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 8 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (articulating a new and more demanding 
pleading standard for evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint: the first step requires the 
exclusion of conclusory allegations, and the second step requires an assessment of whether a 
plausible fit exists between the non-conclusory facts alleged and the judicial relief claimed); 
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (expanding the rule articulated in Totten v. United States, 92 
U.S. 105 (1876), “prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage 
agreements”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (imposing more demanding 
standing requirements); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (delimiting Congress’s role in 
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consequences of that insulation is the denial of judicial relief to 
individuals arguably denied a legal right by executive officers or those 
private parties acting in concert with them, the undermining of checks 
and balances in our governing scheme, the lack of accountability for 
unlawful or illegal conduct committed by members of the executive 
branch, and the betrayal by the courts of their ultimate responsibility to 
uphold the rule of law. 
Because I understand Reynolds, as well as other Supreme Court 
decisions decided during the same period, as expressions of a frame of 
mind squarely rooted in the international crisis at the time and in the 
emergence of the presidency as the overwhelming dominant power in 
the United States, my pursuit to enhance my understanding of that era 
led me to Clinton Rossiter’s book. 
II.     CLINTON ROSSITER’S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 
Clinton Rossiter was a student of the nationally prominent 
presidential scholar Edward S. Corwin (indeed he dedicated 
Constitutional Dictatorship to Edward S. Corwin and Robert E. 
Cushman), who was “the leading scholar of his era on the Constitution 
and the presidency.”9 Rossiter’s early works10 were deeply influenced by 
Corwin’s scholarly values and approach which emphasized legal and 
historical considerations. Indeed, one of the reviewers of Rossiter’s 
Constitutional Dictatorship, which was Rossiter’s first book, specifically 
noted that Rossiter “thinks in formal and juristic rather than in concrete 
and historical political terms,”11 a criticism that seems aimed not only at 
Rossiter but also at Corwin. Between the publication of Constitutional 
Dictatorship and 1970, when Rossiter took his own life, Rossiter became 
a nationally prominent scholar, author, teacher and lecturer. However, 
as illustrious as he was, Rossiter may never have been in step with the 
 
agency oversight by declaring the one-house legislative veto unconstitutional); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (declaring that the president is absolutely immune from civil 
damages liability for his official acts); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
plurality opinion) (dismissing the action on the ground that the case presented a non-
justiciable political question); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683 (granting the president a 
constitutionally based executive privilege); Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1 (announcing new rules to 
guide the application of the state secrets privilege); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 614 
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the state secrets privilege before a responsive pleading is 
filed on the ground that the litigation presents an unacceptable risk that a state secret may be 
inadvertently made public); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing the action 
on the ground that no Bivens claim for relief is available on the facts of the case absent 
congressional authorization). 
 9 CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY xii (1987). 
 10 See CD, supra note 1; CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER 
IN CHIEF (expanded ed. 1976). 
 11 William Ebenstein, Book Review, 54 AM. HIST. REV. 562, 564 (1949). 
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main currents of his scholarly discipline. Thus, by the time that 
Constitutional Dictatorship was published, the era of political science 
exemplified by Edward S. Corwin had crested, and by the time Rossiter 
had moved past his renowned teacher and wrote his celebrated The 
American Presidency, published in 1956, “adherents of the behavioral 
persuasion in political science were at or near their peak or evangelical 
fervor.”12 The prominent political scientist Theodore Lowi characterized 
the ironies of Rossiter’s relationship with the fashions of his discipline 
by stating that Rossiter’s scholarship was in one sense “about twenty 
years too late,” and in another sense “about ten years too early.”13 
Rossiter wrote Constitutional Dictatorship during tormented times. 
World War II inaugurated the atomic age. The United States had the 
bomb and within a few years the Soviet Union had it, too. In addition, 
World War II had shattered “the international system beyond 
recognition. Across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, the 
greatest conflict ever waged left a broad swath of destruction and human 
misery.”14 Moreover, the West soon adopted Winston Churchill’s 1946 
language as axiomatic that “an Iron Curtain has descended across”15 the 
European continent, and the following year the United States embraced 
George F. Kennan’s advice set forth in his Foreign Affairs article that he 
signed as “X,” that the West shape and implement a policy of 
containment to blunt Soviet expansion and aggressiveness.16 It was in 
this context that the United States experienced what is generally thought 
of as the dawn of the national security state. The National Security Act 
of July 1947—the “Magna Carta of the national security state”17—was 
adopted and created a cabinet level, civilian secretary of defense to 
preside over separate departments of the army, navy and air force; it 
institutionalized the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff; it established the 
National Security Council in the White House; and it established the 
Central Intelligence Agency to replace the defunct Office of Strategic 
Services.18 During the same timeframe, a war engulfed China, and soon 
thereafter the United States was engaged in a land war in Korea. On the 
domestic front, Senator Joseph McCarthy inaugurated a repressive 
period that bears his name with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia on 
February 9, 1950, in which he stated, according to Richard H. Rovere, 
 
 12 ROSSITER, supra note 9, at xiv. 
 13 Id. at xxvii. 
 14 GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 595 (2008). 
 15 Id. at 605. 
 16 George Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947). 
 17 HERRING, supra note 14, at 614. 
 18 Id. 
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that the “Department of State was full of Communists and that he and 
the Secretary of State knew their names.”19 
So it was in this period of intense domestic and international 
turmoil that Rossiter wrote Constitutional Dictatorship and Princeton 
University Press published it. Rossiter seems to have been motivated to 
write his book because he believed that the atomic age made it a 
necessity for the national government to have new and enhanced 
powers going forward. From his perspective, “the Bomb has settled once 
and for all the question whether the United States can go back to being 
what Harold Laski has labeled (a little too contemptuously) a ‘negative 
state.’”20 Rossiter insisted that you “can’t go home again; the positive 
state is here to stay, and from now on the accent will be on power, not 
limitations.”21 
Indeed, Rossiter went further. “From this day forward,” Rossiter 
declared, “we must cease wasting our energies in discussing whether the 
government of the United States is to be powerful or not.” The United 
States “is going to be powerful,” Rossiter announced, or it will be 
“obliterated.”22 “Our problem,” Rossiter stated, “is to make that power 
effective and responsible, to make any future dictatorship a 
constitutional one.”23 Furthermore, according to Rossiter, “it is not too 
much to say that the destiny of this nation in the Atomic Age will rest in 
the capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional 
dictatorship.”24 In other words, for Rossiter, in the wake of World War 
II, the confrontation with the Soviet Union along with the development 
of nuclear weapons, meant that “the age-old phenomenon of 
constitutional dictatorship has reached the peak of its significance,”25 
and the consequence of these dynamics is the grant of exceptional 
power to the chief executive. Or as Rossiter asserted, “[c]risis 
government is primarily and often exclusively the business of presidents 
and prime ministers,”26 and to secure the nation’s security in the future, 
Rossiter maintained that “[n]o sacrifice is too great for our democracy, 
least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself.”27 This was 
Rossiter’s frame of mind as he prepared his comparative study of 
different nation states during times of crisis. 
Rossiter begins his study, which may have been a revision of his 
dissertation, with two questions: “Is there in all republics this inherent 
 
 19 RICHARD H. ROVERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY 6 (1959). 
 20 CD, supra note 1, at 314. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 287. 
 25 Id. at 13. 
 26 Id. at 12. 
 27 Id. at 314. 
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and fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be too strong for the 
liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”28 
Rossiter immediately illustrates the dilemma by referencing President 
Lincoln’s famous message to Congress dated July 4, 1861, in which he, 
after he had authorized military commanders to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus between Philadelphia and Washington, asked 
rhetorically: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”29 Rossiter then 
ends his first paragraph by imagining what Lincoln would say if he had 
been living in 1942: “Can a democracy fight a successful total war and 
still be a democracy when the war is over?”30 
In answering his question and Lincoln’s question, Rossiter again 
relies upon Lincoln’s conduct to provide not only Lincoln’s response but 
also Rossiter’s own response to the questions. Lincoln “answered it 
himself,” Rossiter wrote, “with a series of unusual actions whereby he 
had personally initiated a military, administrative, and legislative 
program to suppress the rebellion of the southern states and preserve 
the American Union,” and by so doing, Lincoln made it clear “that in all 
republics there is not this inherent and fatal weakness, that a 
democratic, constitutional government beset by a severe national 
emergency can be strong enough to maintain its own existence without 
at the same time being so strong as to subvert the liberties of the people 
it has been instituted to defend.”31 And in case there be any doubt as to 
Rossiter’s views about the theoretical prospects of modern democracies 
in the wake of “total war,” Rossiter wrote that the “incontestable facts of 
history” affirmatively establish that a democracy can fight a total war 
and still be a democracy “when the war is over.”32 
Rossiter’s thesis is quickly summarized. In times of crisis a free and 
democratic state must have some mechanism by which its “leaders 
could take dictatorial action in its defense.”33 If such a state lacked such 
capacity, or if its leaders lacked the will to use such power, the state “did 
not survive its first real crisis.”34 In fact [n]o democracy “ever went 
through a period of thoroughgoing constitutional dictatorship without 
some permanent and often unfavorable alteration in its governmental 
scheme.”35 The period of dictatorship is dangerous and must be 
controlled by the people. If it is not controlled the democratic state will 
 
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in LINCOLN: 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 253 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
 30 CD, supra note 1, at 3. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 13. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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disappear. If it is controlled too tightly the democratic state may 
succumb to the threat and thus disappear. The challenge is to thread the 
eye of this narrow needle to ensure that the democratic state survives the 
crisis without sacrificing its democracy. 
Rossiter argues that the demands of dictatorship find its “rationale” 
in three basic facts. One, the complex system of an ordinary democratic 
government is “essentially designed to function under normal, peaceful 
conditions, and is often unequal to the exigencies of a great national 
crisis.”36 Two, during a national crisis, which Rossiter defines as during a 
time of war, rebellion or economic depression, the government will 
become stronger to overcome the peril and the people will have fewer 
rights.37 Three, the empowered crisis government, “which in some 
instances might become an outright dictatorship,”38 must have “no 
other purposes than the preservation of the independence of the state, 
the maintenance of the existing constitutional order, and the defense of 
the political and social liberties of the people.”39 Rossiter states without 
reservation or hesitancy that the dictatorial regime may “act arbitrarily 
and even dictatorially in the swift adoption of measures designed to save 
the state and its people from the destructive effects of the particular 
crisis.”40 
In some respects the heart of Rossiter’s prescription for assuring 
that the paradox of a democratic state—to safeguard the liberties of its 
people while safeguarding itself—are set forth in eleven principles. 
These eleven guideposts41 can be boiled down to the following claims: 
limit the assumption of dictatorial power to situations where such 
power is “necessary or even indispensable”; the would-be possessor of 
such power should not possess the authority to trigger the grant of such 
power; the grant of such power must be accompanied by a mechanism 
for terminating it; the power granted should be commensurate with the 
crisis and exercised in particular situations only to the extent required; 
the grant of such power should not extend beyond the crisis; and the 
termination of such power must be followed by as complete a return to 
pre-existing status as possible. 
Rossiter imaginatively and impressively offers four case studies to 
illustrate and support his thesis: the Roman Dictatorship; the German 
Republic of 1919 to 1933; the 1878 State of Siege law and the history of 
France from then to World War II; crisis government in Great Britain 
from 1914 to 1939; and lastly crisis government in the United States 
 
 36 Id. at 5. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 7. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. at 298–306. 
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from before the Civil War to World War II. Of the four case studies, the 
one focusing on the Roman Republic is by far the shortest and seems 
almost out of place by comparison to the other studies, a fact to which 
Rossiter is sensitive. This is evidenced by his (more or less) request that 
the reader be tolerant of its inclusion, which Rossiter attributes to his 
“classical education.”42 Nonetheless, the inclusion of the Roman 
procedures does serve to illustrate Rossiter’s substantive claim that 
democratic societies have relied upon exceptional, dictatorial powers to 
defend themselves during times of crisis since ancient times. 
III.     ROSSITER ON ROME AND THE UNITED STATES 
Rossiter’s opening sentence in his chapter on the Roman 
dictatorship ties his general thesis to Rome: “The assertion that 
constitutional dictatorship has always been an indispensable accessory 
to constitutional government finds convincing demonstration in the 
heroic history of republican Rome.”43 For Rossiter, the “Roman people 
grasped and solved the difficult problem of emergency powers . . . so 
uniquely and boldly that a study of modern” government during a time 
of crisis will “find no more propitious a starting point than a brief” 
review of the Roman Republic.44 And the Romans, alone among the 
“nations of antiquity,” made a constitutional dictatorship, which 
Rossiter concedes “never” functioned as “a perfect ideal”45 or “a regular 
instrument of government.”46 Although Rossiter doubted the relevance 
of Roman political institutions to the modern age, he thought that the 
Roman dictatorship “is invaluable”47 as a “theoretical standard, as a sort 
of moral yardstick against which to measure modern institutions of 
constitutional dictatorship.”48 Rossiter describes the dictatorship 
provisions in Rome: 
whereby in time of crisis an eminent citizen was called upon by the 
ordinary officials of a constitutional republic, and was temporarily 
granted absolute power over its whole life, not to subvert but to 
defend the republic, its constitution, and its independence. Most 
significant of all, provision for this emergency institution was made 
in the fundamental laws of the state.49 
 
 42 Id. at vii. 
 43 Id. at 15. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 16. 
 46 Id. at 15. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 16. 
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When Rossiter turns his attention to the United States, he 
immediately concedes as he introduces his discussion of the United 
States that it is “stretching the point considerably to say that any 
American government has ever been a constitutional dictatorship.”50 
Indeed, he writes that “the application of this book’s title to American 
experiences with crisis government is little more than a convenient 
hyperbole.”51 In fact, Rossiter comes very close to conceding that when 
the United States’ experience during the Civil War, World War I and II 
and the Depression of 1933 is compared to the “emergency regimes in 
France, England, and Weimar Germany,” it would appear that the 
government of the United States during these crises “acted in 
remarkably close conformance to the normal constitutional scheme,”52 
and that crisis government has “been a matter of personalities rather 
than of institutions,” with the “one consistent instrument of emergency 
government” being the “Presidency itself.”53 One result of this history is 
“[s]trong government and abnormal government alike are anathema to 
the traditional American philosophy of politics.”54 Moreover, while the 
“Constitution is no insurmountable barrier to the law of national self-
preservation,”55 it will “put a curb on the probability of constitutional 
dictatorship not paralleled in the governmental system of any other 
country,” and as a result, “constitutional dictatorship is still less of a 
possibility in the United States than in almost any other country on 
earth.”56 
Rossiter’s discussion of martial law in the United States illustrates 
his view that neither the courts nor the legislature could ultimately 
contain the exercise of presidential power in times of crisis. Thus, in 
discussing the imposition of martial law during a time of domestic 
crisis, Rossiter noted that although state governments have been the 
primary implementers of martial law, the federal government has the 
authority to declare a state of martial law. “From the Whiskey Rebellion 
of 1794 . . . to the government’s seizure of several strike-bound 
industries in 1946 this power has never been doubted, and it has always 
been for the President alone to decide when and how and to what extent 
it is to be employed.”57 More tellingly, perhaps, given Rossiter’s overall 
disposition to expect the president to be the ultimate guardian of order 
and security, Rossiter argues that “only effective restrictions” on 
presidential use of armed forces to keep the peace are the president’s 
 
 50 Id. at 209. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 210. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 212. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 216. 
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“own political and moral sense and the remote possibility of 
impeachment.”58 
Rossiter’s comments on President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
famous one hundred days are also revealing of his precepts and his 
ambivalences. Thus, Rossiter asks in discussing 1933:  
[W]hat were the elements which made the government of the United 
States in 1933 a positive crisis government? The answer is: the 
personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt and five recognized crisis 
techniques—executive initiative, executive leadership of legislation, 
an abbreviated legislative process, the delegation of powers by 
statute, and an expansion of the administrative branch. In brief, the 
crisis government of 1933 was marked by an unprecedented 
breakdown of the constitutional barriers separating Congress and the 
President.59  
And then a few pages later, Rossiter goes further and claims that, with 
regard to the First One Hundred Days, never before in this history of 
the United States had “the gap” between the President and the Congress 
“been so completely and effectively bridged.”60 At the same time, 
Rossiter softens his position a few pages later and writes that whatever 
may be said of FDR in the “White House or in Yalta, he was no dictator 
on Capitol Hill.”61 
In sum, Rossiter perceives the power of the presidency as a 
“boundless grant of executive authority found in the Constitution, 
supplemented by broad delegations of discretionary competence from 
the national legislature.”62 In Rossiter’s mind the “limitations [on the 
exercise of presidential power] are the political sense of the incumbent 
and the patience of the American people; its effectiveness rests in the 
personality and energy of the President himself and the circumstances 
with which he has to deal.”63 And then, as if minimizing or dismissing 
the checks and balances in the governmental scheme exercised by 
Congress and the courts,64 Rossiter asserts that “the Presidency does 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 256. 
 60 Id. at 260. 
 61 Id. at 271. 
 62 Id. at 286. 
 63 Id. 
 64 With regard to Rossiter’s evaluation of the capacity of the courts to contain executive 
power, see ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, supra note 10, at 
129. Rossiter noted: 
[T]he Court has had little success in preventing the precedents of war from becoming 
precedents of peace. We might even go so far as to say that the Court has made a 
positive contribution to the permanent peacetime weakening of the separation of 
powers, the principle of non-delegation, the Fifth Amendment, and the necessary 
and proper clause as applicable limits to governmental power. 
Id. By insisting that the two Constitutions, one for peace and the other for war, “were really 
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present a serious potential danger to the American people. It is for them 
to be eternally vigilant, to demand that this vast display of power be 
wielded in their behalf, as hitherto it always has been, and not against 
them.”65 
IV.     REVIEWS OF ROSSITER’S BOOK 
In general Rossiter’s book was positively reviewed at the time. One 
reviewer termed Rossiter’s study a “valuable contribution”;66 another 
termed it “a real service by suggesting several significant reforms in our 
governmental system intended to make it less difficult to impose 
enforceable limitations upon the use of emergency power”;67 a third 
stated that Rossiter’s study was “an important book . . . because of its 
subject matter and its clarity of style[,] organization and execution”;68 
still another characterized the study as a “judicious discussion of an 
important subject”;69 a fifth reviewer stated the study was a “carefully 
documented analysis of the theory and practice of crisis government in 
Western democracies”;70 and another concluded that Rossiter’s study 
was a “useful starting point for trenchant inquiries” into the “devices 
which constitutional governments have utilized to preserve themselves 
in the recurrent crises of the twentieth century.”71 Nonetheless, there 
were dissenting views. One reviewer concluded that Rossiter’s study 
“must be considered a failure as far as the appraisal of the basic 
problems is concerned.”72 Another stated that the “most regrettable 
thing about the book is that so much good work should have been 
marred by errors of form and conception.”73 And still another stated: 
“The failure of the author’s attempt to group all uses of emergency 
powers together under a single heading—and that the rather misleading 
one of ‘constitutional dictatorship’—is indicated by the platitudinous 
nature of the conclusions he is driven to in his last chapter. This is a 
 
only one, the Court has contributed heavily to that emphasis on the Constitution as grant of 
power that dominates present [1950] constitutional law.” Id. at 129–130 (alteration in original). 
 65 CD, supra note 1, at 287; see also ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER 
IN CHIEF, supra note 10, at 131 (“Most important, the defense of the Constitution rests at 
bottom exactly where the defense of the nation rests: in the good sense and good will of the 
political branches of the national government, which for most martial purposes must mean the 
President and his military commanders.”). 
 66 Karl Loewenstein, Book Review, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1006, 1006 (1948). 
 67 Virginia Wood, Book Review, 11 J. POL. 261, 263 (1949). 
 68 Charles H. Shull, Book Review, 260 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 198, 199 (1948). 
 69 Carl Brent Swisher, Book Review, 12 MILITARY AFF. 243, 244 (1948). 
 70 Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., Book Review, 2 W. POL. Q. 665, 665 (1949). 
 71 M. DeW. H., Book Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. 351, 352 (1948). 
 72 Ebenstein, supra note 11, at 563. 
 73 Herman Finer, Book Review, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 724, 728 (1949). 
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pity, because the separate studies which form the main body of the book 
are thorough, scholarly, and in themselves very useful.”74 
Many of the reviewers quite properly took Rossiter to task for the 
use of the term “constitutional dictatorship.” As one wrote, although 
Rossiter used the term “constitutional dictatorship” in the title and 
repeatedly in the text, he, “for his own protection . . . finds it necessary 
to explain away most of the content” in that “[h]e characterizes the 
phrase as ‘hyperbole,’” or as “a rag-bag phrase.”75 Another review 
persuasively commented that Rossiter’s own description of Lincoln and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidencies were, as noted above, inconsistent 
with the fundamental idea of a constitutional dictatorship. Thus, Karl 
Loewenstein claimed that since “Lincoln’s actions were supported by 
Congressional approval and ratification”76 and Roosevelt’s actions “were 
either subsequently ratified or authorized in advance by Congress, with 
full support of public opinion,”77 Rossiter “is disregarding his own 
[historical] material to suit his semantic premises . . . .”78 Loewenstein 
further explained that Rossiter’s error is more than a nomenclature 
error since his conflagration of a strong executive with a constitutional 
dictatorship renders the term “‘constitutional’ dictatorship . . . rather 
meaningless”79 and in the end detracts from a more thoughtful and 
fruitful analysis of the implications for democratic processes and values 
of a strong executive. 
With few exceptions,80 and this is true whether the review was 
complimentary or critical, the reviewers actually missed Rossiter’s 
essential perception regarding the United States, a perception not 
evident in his historical analysis of the United States—or Germany, 
France, Great Britain or Rome for that matter—but evident in his 
chapters before and after the historical analysis. In short, Rossiter 
thought that the emergence of the Atomic Age meant that going 
forward the United States must always remain a powerful military 
power, that there would be no significant difference between a time of 
peace and a time of war, and that the defense and survival of the United 
 
 74 Alfred Cobban, Book Review, 25 INT’L AFF. 195, 196 (1949). 
 75 Swisher, supra note 69, at 244.  
 76 Lowenestein, supra note 66, at 1008. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 One reviewer did understand the value of Rossiter’s glimpse of the future and 
characterized Rossiter’s view as follows: “He predicts that with the future will come more rather 
than less frequent use of emergency power and that ‘the destiny of this nation in the Atomic 
Age will rest in the capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional dictatorship.’” 
Wood, supra note 67, at 263. Another reviewer, Hans J. Morgenthau, understood at the time 
the value of what Rossiter claimed and complimented Rossiter for facing a “burning problem 
squarely” that others in the discipline “generally shun or . . . treat like a pathological 
abnormality.” Hans J. Morgenthau, Book Review, 54 AM. J. SOC. 566, 566 (1949). 
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States required a presidency that possessed power greater in scope and 
character than the power possessed by prior presidents. 
LAST WORDS 
Looking back, Rossiter’s major and overlooked contribution was 
his contention that the end of World War II and the inauguration of the 
atomic age meant an increase of federal power, the dominance of the 
executive branch over the legislative branch, and the loss of democratic 
values and individual liberties. That argument was overlooked by most 
reviewers at the time. 
In accordance with this general position, Rossiter did not pretend 
that in the wake of World War II and the emergence of the atomic age 
that the United States would return to its pre-World War II governing 
forms. Instead he claimed that fundamental shifts were occurring in the 
United States and that the federal government would possess more 
power than ever before. Rossiter further claimed that such power was 
necessary to meet the challenges the nation faced while acknowledging 
that the existence of such power threatened the nation’s democratic 
political premises. Second, Rossiter argued that the presidency would 
emerge as the dominant branch of government, that the new power 
centralized in that office undermined the assumption that a 
democratic—as opposed to an authoritarian—political structure 
required an allocation of power that allowed for an effective system of 
checks and balances. Third, the assumption of new power at the federal 
level and the concentration of that power in the presidency were 
permanent. So in contrast to past periods when a crisis ended and there 
was a concerted effort to drain the power from government entities that 
had exercised it during the crisis, there would now be no draining. In 
short, the old categories of war and peace were too simplistic to fit the 
new age, or as Rossiter wrote, “[y]ou can’t go home again.”81 For 
Rossiter, the consolidation of such permanent power constituted a shift 
in the national paradigm that threatened constitutional democracy and 
individual liberty, but was necessary for the preservation of the national 
security. 
In retrospect, Rossiter’s book has many important shortcomings. I 
will briefly identify three. First, Rossiter’s explanation of the 
circumstances that would prompt the necessary assumption of 
dictatorial powers was incomplete. His identification of war, rebellion 
and economic depression left out, among other considerations, the 
scramble for energy sources, strategic trading interests, preemptive wars 
in the name of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and conflicts that may be 
 
 81 CD, supra note 1, at 314. 
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driven by ideological forces. Second, Rossiter’s model of dictatorial 
power was, not surprisingly, rooted in past experiences, and he did not 
foresee future developments that enhanced the power of the state and 
diminished structural checks and balances in the governmental scheme 
as well as individual liberty and privacy. A few examples illustrate the 
limitations of this model. One, Rossiter did not foresee the emergence of 
the surveillance state represented by the National Security Agency or 
other intelligence agencies, the new power they constituted in the hands 
of executive officials and the threat they presented to the democratic 
values and individual liberty. Two, Rossiter did not foresee the 
enormous expansion—perhaps inconceivable from Rossiter’s vantage 
point—of the national security state that extended well beyond the 
iconic CIA and NSA. Three, Rossiter did not foresee the expansion of 
secrecy in the execution of executive branch actions across and ever 
expanding area of activity, a development that hid from public view and 
accountability important governmental actions. Four, Rossiter’s model 
of constitutional democracy was incomplete and too simple. Two 
examples illustrate this point. The emergence of a powerful executive 
supported by a large number of agencies with extensive influence to 
make and execute policy often hidden from public view by claims of 
secrecy, which in turn are premised on national security considerations, 
put the voting public at a serious disadvantage in knowing what its 
government does on its behalf and in holding the government 
accountable. Second, although Rossiter was aware of the German and 
Italian abuse of the mass media in the 1920s and the 1930s to 
manufacture democratic consent, he did not integrate into his analysis 
the power of the state going forward to distort the democratic process 
by abusing the mass media to create public support for policies 
premised on incomplete, misleading, and false information. 
Rossiter’s most troubling weakness was his assumption that the 
nation’s survival required authoritarian rule by an executive that 
dominated the legislature and the courts and sharply curtailed 
individual liberty. And although Rossiter stated at one point that no 
sacrifice was too great for the long term preservation of the democracy, 
least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy, Rossiter’s underlying 
analysis suggested that he did not think that the autocratic and 
repressive new regime he endorsed as necessary was in any meaningful 
sense temporary or short lived. Thus, although Rossiter tried to dress up 
his prescription for national security as temporary, his underlying 
analysis suggested that it was more or less permanent. In other words, 
Rossiter’s prediction as to what would occur in the United States had 
much more merit to it than his claim as to what should happen. 
The challenge now confronting the United States is not to try to 
return—to use Rossiter’s era as a benchmark—to a pre-World War II 
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presidency and executive branch. Instead, what is required is the 
emergence of a new and responsible congressional authority in national 
security matters that harnesses executive power and the assertion of new 
forms of judicial authority that impose meaningful accountability on 
executive power. In short, to paraphrase Rossiter, we may not be able to 
go home again, but there is no reason why we cannot shape new 
structures that limit executive power and enhance governmental 
transparency and accountability. 
As much as Rossiter’s Constitutional Dictatorship opens a 
fascinating window into the mindset of his times, the values underlying 
his basic claim that the security of the nation going forward required an 
executive free of meaningful legislative and judicial oversight and the 
sacrifice of individual liberty were erroneous and fundamentally 
misplaced. Indeed, Rossiter seems to have been overwhelmed by 
national security threats and unwilling to countenance risks required by 
democracy and liberty, and in reaching this calculation Rossiter seems 
to have forgotten Louis Brandeis’ reminder that the nation’s founders 
who made a revolution were not cowards82 and Benjamin Franklin’s 
admonition that those who sacrifice essential liberty in the name of 
temporary security deserve neither.83 
 
 82 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 83 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA 289 (1759) (“Those who would give up essential liberty to 
purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”). 
